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Law, the Problems of Poverty, and the "Myth of 
Rights" 
Michael Diamond* 
The subject of this symposium is the relationship between 
law and moral order. This relationship has been the subject of 
scholarly debate for centuries and yet it remains difficult to de- 
fine, primarily because the nature of the moral order itself re- 
mains obscure. In recent years the debate has been joined by 
Professor H.L.A. Hart and Professor Lon Fuller. In a series of 
books and articles1 they have argued about the meaning of law 
and its relationship to morality. I will touch on both of their 
theories later in this paper, but because I find neither approach 
satisfying, I will suggest a different analysis. 
The position I take is (1) that there is no moral order using 
the common or religious meaning of the word "moral"; (2) that 
there is a disparity between what the law promises and what it 
provides; and (3) that this disparity is due to the inability of the 
law to change relationships which are basically economic rather 
than legal in nature. 
When I say that there is no moral order-using the common 
or religious meaning of "moral"-I do not mean to deny the ex- 
istence of individual moral sensibilities or judgments. Rather, I 
deny the existence in society of a normative consensus that is 
based upon some underlying, more or less fixed, "religious" mo- 
rality. I believe there is an order in society, but it is an order 
based more on economic and political considerations than on 
* Professor of Law, Antioch School of Law, Washington, D.C.; J.D., 1969, Fordham 
University; L.L.M., 1971, New York University, as a VISTA Fellow; also currently sew- 
ing as a Visiting Scholor at the District of Columbia Law Revision Commission. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his colleague, Frank Munger, who 
helped the author to put his ideas in perspective; to the other participants in the Law 
and Morality Symposium at Brigham Young University Law School; and to Larry Davis 
for patient work on the various drafts of this article. 
1. See, e.g., L. FUUBR, THB MORALITY OF LAW (1964); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW (1961); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to h w - A  Reply to Professor Hart, 71 
HAW. L. REV. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HAW. L. REV. 593 (1958). 
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moral or ethical ones. Given our limited  resource^,^ the struggle 
to shape societal goals becomes a political one in which power, 
often economic power, is the controlling factor. Thus, I believe 
what some writers have viewed as a moral order is actually more 
of a power order. It is an order in which economic, social, and 
political power, rather than morality, play the fundamental 
roles. At the root of the problem of defining the relationship be- 
tween law and morality is our pluralistic society: attempting to 
develop law which will fulfill the needs of all its members. 
The core question of the relationship of law and morality is 
to what extent the law can in practice fulfill the sense of justice , 
or the moral norms of members of society. Clearly, I think, the 
law can articulate strongly held convictions of large segments of 
the society. These formulations, however, suffer from relativistic 
and majoritarian tinge that detracts from the concept of moral- 
ity. It appears that law, rather than reflecting a universal (or 
nearly universal) set of basic principles and goals, reflects and 
fulfills the goals of those in control of the political apparatus. 
And even if the law were neutrally benign-the result of Rawls' 
veil of ignorance4-I would argue that in certain spheres any 
currently foreseeable use of the law is incapable (from an eco- 
nomic standpoint) of resolving problems of the society. This im- 
plies a clear distinction between law as a social norm and law as 
a political reality. 
The direction I propose to pursue in analyzing the relation- 
ship of law to social norms avoids the fascinating but, I think, 
unanswerable (although not unarguable) question of the source 
2. For a discussion of the distribution of limited resources see Hardin, The Tragedy 
of the Commons, 162 SCIBNCE 1243 (1968). 
3. I use the term "pluralistic society" to mean a society that encompasses several 
different value systems. Moreover, unlike primitive societies in which there may be group 
value consensus on a range of issues, the pluralistic society may find individuals crossing 
group lines for value orientation. Therefore, the "value system group" is less likely to be 
found today than in primitive times. 
4. See J. R.AWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22,136-42 (1971). Professor Sam Donnelly 
defines Rawls' "veil of ignorance" as follows: 
Briefly stated, he imagines that hypothetical contracting parties meet to agree 
upon principles of justice and structure of government for their society, which 
could be any society. The parties are ignorant of their own particular situation 
in life with its peculiar advantages and disadvantages. Rawls argues that this 
veil of ignorance reproduma the conditions necessary for making objective 
decisions. 
Donnelly, A Theory of Justice, Judicial Methodology, and the Constitutionality of 
Capital Punishment: Rawls, Dworkin, and a Theory of Criminal Responsibility, 29 SYR- 
ACUSE L. REV. 1109, 1118 n.55 (1978). 
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and nature of law. Instead, I will address the relationship be- 
tween law on the one hand and politics and economics on the 
other and ask, "How far can the law go in achieving goals of 
political and economic equality?" 
To illustrate my analysis I will refer to the problem of pro- 
viding housing for low-income citizens, a problem that graphi- 
cally illustrates the shortcomings of the law.' In the housing 
field one might ask, "To what extent can the law achieve 'de- 
cent, safe and ~anitary'~ housing at  affordable prices for the na- 
tion's urban poor?" This has been a stated goal of the law both 
on a national and local level for years.7 The goal has not been 
reached and progress in the area has been minimal. Why, when 
statutes have been enacted, amended to meet new problems and 
redesigned to accommodate new theories, does the problem of 
low-income housing remain intractable? I believe the answer lies 
in the hard reality that the law is often isolated from the social 
context in which it purports to operate. Decisions concerning the 
composition of a law often leave out of their calculations the ba- 
sic social, political, and economic conditions in which the law 
must be applied. 
For instance, shortly after the depression, the government 
instituted a program of government owned housinp to accom- 
modate the poor and homeless. However, social and economic 
factors were not accommodated in creating the program. Build- 
ing design was unimaginative; amenities were minimal or nonex- 
istent; and economic segregation was the universal, if not the in- 
evitable, outcome. The result was a social stigmatization of the 
poor which was, ostensibly, not intended. 
[Tlhe initial proponents of the program had operated on the 
assumption that changing the physical housing conditions of 
the poor would have a major impact on tenants' behavior. It 
has become increasingly difficult to demonstrate the program's 
effectiveness in these terms. . . . [Tlhe product has often been 
5. Although I will focus on low-income housing problems in this article, other is- 
sues-such as environmental protection, public welfare, or women's righta-could have 
been effectively used to illustrate my poeition. 
6. See United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, g 1,50 Stat. 888 (1937), which set 
the goal of providing a "decent, safe and sanitary" home for all Americana. 
7. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE g 50002 (WEST 1979); JAWS V. FIRST NAT'L 
REALTY CORP., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
8. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, g 1, 50 Stat. 888 (1937). See also 
Friedman, Public Housing a d  the Poor, in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 448 (J. Pynoos, R. 
Schafer & C. Hartman eds. 1973). 
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of inferior quality because of lack of maintenance and an un- 
willingness to provide more than a minimal level of amenities 
to the poor? 
In the 1960's the federal government turned to subsidizing 
private development of low-income housing, but costs soon out- 
stripped the government's ability to subsidize.1° Local govern- 
ments became involved and tried to force owners of rental prop- 
erty to maintain those properties,ll but here, too, economic 
realities as well as conflicting laws resulted in little improvement 
in housing conditions. 
The problems of low-income housing traditionally have not 
been legal ones. The law has adopted the problems in the count- 
less statutes, regulations, court opinions, and programs which 
have been promulgated pertaining to the field; yet housing re- 
mains too expensive for those at the lower end of the economic 
spectrum to obtain or adequately maintain. 
The following example illustrates the problem. Posit a ten- 
ant who is careful and considerate about the property he or she 
rents but who has little money. Posit also an owner who wishes 
(and attempts) to maintain a clean, safe building while making a 
reasonable profit. Further assume a base period in which rent 
paid has been reasonable in terms both of tenant income and 
owner costs. Finally, assume that an inflationary period similar 
to that of the 1970's exists. In the 1970's costs escalated at a rate 
far in excess of the increases in the incomes of the urban poor 
(many of whom receive relatively fixed government transfer pay- 
ments and others of whom are in jobs with little upward mobil- 
ity and little internal financial leverage). 
Given this hypothetical, the increasing housing costs due to 
inflation (labor, materials, taxes, insurance, etc.) put pressure on 
the owner to increase rents in order to maintain a reasonable 
profit margin. If, however, the tenant is poor, he or she might 
not be able to afford the increased rent. If a new tenant cannot 
9. HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 16 (J. Pynoos, R. Schafer & C. Hartman eds. 1973). 
10. For studies and criticism of housing subsidy programs, see A. DOWNS, FEDERAL 
HOUSING SUBSIDIES: HOW ARB THEY WORKING? (1973). Swan, Housing Subsidies and 
Housing Starts, in 2 HOUSING IN THE SEVEN TIE^, WORKING PAPERS (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & 
Urb. Dev. 1976). 
11. Building and housing codes and warranties of habitability have set requirements ' 
for the construction and maintenance of housing. The National Commission on Urban 
Problems reported that such building and housing codes are rarely enforced. See U.S. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION F URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 
34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273-307 (1968). 
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be found who is able and willing to pay the increased rent (this 
situation is most likely to exist in hard core, poor neighborhoods 
where the prospect of wide-scale rehabilitation that would 
change the economic composition of the community is too small 
to be realistically hoped for), the owner's next option for main- 
taining a profit is to cut costs by deferring and eliminating 
maintenance, thus beginning what is known as "disinvestment." 
Disinvestment may be a result of a conscious choice by the own- 
er to maintain an acceptable profit margin, or it may result from 
the fact that the owner, like the tenant, simply cannot afford to 
absorb the increased costs of maintaining the building. 
The law on occasion may be able to deal with the acute ef- 
fects of disinvestment. But given many great societal needs com- 
peting for limited societal resources, the law cannot eliminate 
the chronic causes of acute manifestations of disinvestment. 
What, for instance, does the law provide in circumstances such 
as the one just posited? It mainly provides for the eviction of 
tenants who fail to pay their rent. If the tenant in this example 
is evicted, the law has merely changed the nature of the social 
problem. It is unlikely that the tenant will be able to find suita- 
ble housing (if any housing is available at all) at an affordable 
price, and it is unlikely that the owner will be able to attract a 
tenant who can pay the necessary rent. If, on the other hand, the 
law attempts to force owners to maintain their property without 
allowing them to raise rents, they may have to abandon the 
property if they are financially unable to comply with the law. 
For wealthier owners, the law will have a chilling effect on fur- 
ther investment. Housing investment, unlike criminal matters or 
divorce, is governed primarily by economics, not law. Building 
owners who cannot afford to maintain their buildings do not be- 
come able to do so simply because the law requires that the 
buildings be maintained. By contrast, in the case of either crimi- 
nal law or family law, the rules tend to be abstract expressions 
of societal norms (whether derived from a moral base or other- 
wise). These norms are personal in that to a great extent each 
person is individually responsible for his or her conduct. It is 
reasonable for society to expect that people who can choose be- 
tween various options confine their conduct to the range of be- 
havior acceptable to society. If, however, due to factors beyond 
the control of the individual, there are no options or the only 
available options are unsatisfactory, the law is unable to solve 
that particular social problem, and if it attempts to do so, its 
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attempts will be erratic or arbitrary? With low-income housing, 
as with other problems of our society, factors other than societal 
norms affect conditions. Elements beyond the control of the va- 
rious actors create circumstances that the law, which deals in 
the realm of personal norms, cannot control. 
Laws pertaining to housing certainly express norms in the 
sense of what ought to be. The National Housing Act of 1937 
speaks of a "decent, safe and sanitary" home for all Americans.lS 
Local building codes set minimum standards for the quality of 
housing and warranties of habitability provide remedies for a 
tenant whose landlord does not comply.14 Our laws in this area 
appear to have the glow of the moral order. But while the laws 
articulate what might be taken as societal norms, forces in soci- 
ety work against the realization of these values. The lack of cor- 
relation between the norms of the law and their realization in 
actual practice may be due to the unwillingness of the powerful 
in society to enforce norms which contravene their own interests 
or goals. Another, less morally damning hypothesis is that the 
law, which is an abstract set of societal norms, cannot mandate 
what economics and politics deny. In a society with a private 
enterprise economy and without sufficient governmental re- 
sources to accomplish all societally articulated norms, the law 
cannot systematically improve the quality of housing. At best, 
some small number of tenants may achieve success in improving 
the quality of their own housing, but their success, I submit, is 
the result of changing the power relationship between them- 
selves and their landlords (with which the use of law certainly 
plays some part) rather than a direct reliance on the terms of a 
law purporting to provide relief. 
Given the disparity between legal norms and societal reali- 
ties, one might question the relationship between law and moral- 
ity. As I have already stated, I believe that there is no "moral" 
order, but rather a power order that dictates the nature of our 
laws and, perhaps more importantly, the effect of our laws. The 
Hart-Fuller debate, which I alluded to earlier, provides a basis 
12. For an application of this principle in a different context, see the Model Penal 
Code's insanity defense and accompanying commentary. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) 
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
13. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 1, 50 Stat. 888 (1937). 
14. See M. TEITZ & S. ROSBNTHAL, HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY 
(Rand Corp. Report No. R-648-NYC 1971). For a discussion of these remedies, see Dia- 
mond, Rehabilitation of Low-Income Housing Through Cooperative Conversion by Ten- 
ants, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 285, 289-95 (1976). 
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for further discussion on this point. 
Professor Hart takes the positivist position. He argues that 
there is a distinction between law and morality. The fact that a 
law exists does not mean that it is morally defensible. Law, ac- 
cording to Hart, is a pronouncement purporting to be law made 
by one with the authority to make such a pronouncement and 
made according to the required procedures. Therefore, law exists 
even if the law is substantively immoral.16 
Fuller, on the other hand, argues that law, to be considered 
law, must merge at some point with morality. If not, he asks, 
how can law be deserving of the respect and fidelity which we 
concede it is owed?'@ For Fuller, law must be composed of two 
"moralities": an external morality that goes to the substance of a 
law and an internal morality that goes to the process of interpre- 
tation and application used by the judge. The external morality 
is apparently based on a "constitution" that is generally ac- 
cepted among the population. The inner morality requires that 
the laws promulgated thereunder be interpreted with a "coher- 
ence" and "inner logic" that Fuller assumes will follow. He 
states, "I shall have to rest on the assertion of a belief that may 
seem naive, namely, that coherence and goodness have more af- 
finity than coherence and evil."17 Fuller presumably would argue 
that a pronouncement purporting to be law but which lacks ei- 
ther of the moralities is not law at all. 
While both Professors Hart and Fuller argue cogently for 
their positions, there seem to be serious flaws in each of their 
positions, which, at least for our purpose, diminish the force of 
their arguments. Primarily from a logical point of view, neither 
defines the concept of morality clearly enough to give one a 
sense of stability. Hart recognizes the problem by saying that 
what "ought" to be is subject to countless variations depending 
who is asked and at what point the question is posed. Further, 
he recognizes that what "ought" to be does not necessarily coin- 
cide with morality. It may be a function of one's desire for self- 
aggrandizement, of pure necessity, or of one's musings ("I ought 
to be able to dance more gracefully").18 
Even when dealing only with a vaguely defined concept of 
morality, it is clear that different cultures view morality differ- 
15. Hart, supra note 1, at 615-21. 
16. Fuller, supra note 1, at 632. 
17. Id. at 636. 
18. Hart, supra note 1, at 613. 
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ently, and the same cultures view it differently at different 
times. Moreover, the shared beliefs that were common to less 
sophisticated societies are less prevalent in the complex, indus- 
trial society in which we live. This moral fragmentation of the 
populace is not only visible among groups but also within them. 
For instance, consider the issue of abortion to be raised in this 
symposium. Can one point to cultural homogeneity among oppo- 
nents of abortion? Clearly this major moral issue cuts across re- 
ligious, economic, and racial lines. People and groups with to- 
tally different needs and aspirations can join on either side of 
this issue, while on another issue-the problem of strip mining 
for instance-the constituencies of the competing viewpoints, 
while still heterogeneous, may be completely different from 
those in the abortion debate. 
Rather than a body of law based upon shared beliefs, or 
even a body of law that shapes beliefs in society, we have law 
that reflects, to a great extent, the result of the political struggle 
between competing beliefs. The question of how benefits should 
be divided in a society with finite resources-a question of pri- 
oritization of goals-is not a question for judges or for law. Such 
questions are questions of policy and are fought in legislatures 
and at the polls. The results of such struggles take on the sym- 
bolic legitimacy of law, but such laws are not solely the result of 
a debate concerning moral or ethical norms but rather the result 
of political and economic compromises. 
The changes in the nature of law and the decline of its abil- 
ity to state (or create) widely held norms to some extent corre- 
sponds with the growth of economic society and its resulting so- 
cial comple~ities.~~ Much of what was based on custom or 
tradition gave way as an influx of people from various culturea 
changed the composition of society and as rapid urbanization 
changed its nature. As technology and economic sophistication 
intruded on a largely agrarian economy the requirements of reg- 
ulation changed the face of the law. With the depression the 
government's involvement in the economy seemed irrevocably 
ordained. Not only did the government attempt to control 
through administrative regulation railroads, communications, 
trucking, and securities, it also became heavily involved in hous- 
19. For a discussion of law in primitive societies, see E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMI- 
TMZ MAN (Atheneum 1974); Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, AM. ANTHRO- 
POLOGIST, Dec. 1965, at 33; and Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, 
38 Soc. RESEARCH 42 (1971). 
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ing, public works, and trade practices. As time went on, the gov- 
ernment entered the fields of environmental protection, energy, 
and health. All of these had aspects of private activity and were 
deeply infused with economic elements. These issues, one may 
argue, are significantly removed from questions of morality. 
They are, rather, questions of resource management and priori- 
tization-questions of political policy. 
To this point, much of what I have discussed has dealt with 
the political nature of law, particularly with the legislative pro- 
cess. Litigation, on the other hand, has been thought of as less 
political and more closely connected with concepts of fairness 
and justice. Judges, however, are not free to determine what is 
"right" and are not particularly well equipped to identify or es- 
tablish norms. Rather, they are trained and commissioned to in- 
terpret the meaning of rules and apply them to particular facts. 
The rules they are asked to apply are often those that result 
from the political process. Moreover, those rules that are derived 
from the common law are limited by constitutional principles 
protecting property rights? These facts, among others, have led 
many lawyers and commentators to criticize the idea that litiga- 
tion, in itself, is a major force in accomplishing social change. 
Stuart Scheingold, one of these critics, argues in his book 
The Politics of Rightss1 that there has developed among social 
activists a "myth of rights9'-an idea that judicial intervention 
will both recognize and enforce rights which essentially redis- 
tribute power." He argues that judicial decisions that broaden 
the scope of public entitlements have been viewed as the end 
point in the struggle for societal change. He cites, for instance, 
the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Edu~ation,'~ 
which struck down the "separate but equal" system of public 
education by which schools were de jure segregated by reason of 
race. Yet despite the great significance of that decision, desegre- 
gation of public schools remains a major challenge confronting 
20. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution provide 
that no person shall be deprived by the state of property without "due process of law." 
The development of this doctrine has often elaborate procedures for protecting the prop- 
erty rights of individuals. These procedures stand as a practical barrier to a government 
sponsored redistribution of wealth. More importantly, the concept found in the due pro- 
cess clause represents a significant philosophical obstacle to redistribution. See S. SCHE- 
INGOLD, TIiJ3 POLITICS OF RIGHTS 105-07 (1974). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 84-85. 
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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our society two and one-half decades later." The judicially pro- 
claimed "right" to a desegregated education has not filtered 
down-at least not to the extent envisioned-to the classroom 
where its effects were supposed to be felt. 
The declaration of the right was not the ultimate goal of its 
proponents-desegregation of the public schools was. Thus, to 
view the Court's decision as a stopping place would be, in effect, 
admitting defeat. This is not to say, however, that the judicial 
decision is meaningless, for it is not. It represents a judicial rec- 
ognition of what one ought to be entitled to. This judicial recog- 
nition provides a resource-a tool-to be used in the political 
forums where the "right7' identified by the court will be shaped 
and have its impact. 
The problem, as Scheingold points out, is that there is a 
certain flux between society's values and its behavior. The dif- 
ference between input and output, between one's moral beliefs 
and one's societal activity, is influenced by external factors such 
as economic or political well-being. These are elements which 
the law often fails to account for. Indeed, it has been argued 
that the law, designed as it generally is by the "haves" of society 
and fraught with procedural safeguards to avoid hasty, ill-con- 
sidered decisions, is a major obstacle to change.26 
With our limited resources and the growing demand for 
goods and services, accomodating the needs of the poor often re- 
quires taking from the remainder of society. This fact often 
reduces lofty values to behavior motivated by material self-in- 
terest. In such circumstances the political question is whether 
the law will enforce moral values. In circumstances such as the 
housing examples suggested above, the question is also whether 
the law can enforce moral values. Because of economic realities 
and the constitutional obstacles to redistribution, my response 
would be in the negative. However, the law, viewed as a tool of 
political struggle rather than as the result of the struggle, offers 
hope for change. The legitimization by the law of new norms, 
the recognition of personal "rights," provides a basis around 
which people can organize so that the legal abstractions may be 
24. S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 20, at 100. 
25. Id. at 118. Scheingold argues that the law is designed to break problems down to 
small, legally cognizable elements. Moreover, remedies fashioned by courts generally re- 
spond to individual injuries caused by these discrete elements. When the cause of the 
problems before the court is not, in a practical sense, capable of being broken down in 
this manner, the remedial result is almost certain to be incomplete. 
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achieved, at least in part. 
Lawyers may play important but not all encompassing roles 
in mobilizations of this sort. They may be technicians or plan- 
ners, advocates or advisors, but they are not, nor is the disci- 
pline in which they function, sufficient to change the political 
and economic organization of our society. Instead, law must be 
recognized as merely one of many, often competing elements 
that shape society and its norms (as well as its behavior). Until 
this is recognized, the law will continue to hold out, particularly 
for the poor of our society, a "myth of rights." 
